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Abstract 
We develop an extended Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) methodology to disentangle the 
welfare impacts of policies for various interest groups along the value chain (to disaggregate 
effects within the “producer” and “consumer” umbrellas). We apply our value chain NRA 
methodology to the case of Pakistan’s price and trade policy. We analyse the welfare implications 
for various agents in the wheat-flour value chain from 2000 to 2013, a period characterized by 
major global price volatility and by regular adjustments of domestic policies. We find that the 
wheat price policy has generally benefitted flour consumers and wheat traders at the expense of 
wheat farmers and to a lesser extent flour millers. Our findings illustrate that the welfare 
implications of policies can be quite different within the “producer” and “consumer” umbrellas, 
which has potentially important implications for economic and political economy analyses and for 
the design of policies that aim to target the poorest groups along value chains. 
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1. Introduction 
Both economic policy and political economy models often consider “producers”, “consumers”, 
and “taxpayers” as the main agents in the economy to study the welfare impacts of policies, their 
incentive effects, and rent (re-)distribution. It is well known that the “real economy” is much more 
complicated and that many more agents are affected – and also play a role in lobbying governments 
to introduce or remove certain policies. In agricultural and food policies “other agents” include 
input suppliers (such as land owners, seed and agro-chemical companies, and rural banks) on the 
upstream side of the value chain and traders, food processors and retail companies on the 
downstream side of the value chain. These agents may be differently affected by policies, 
depending on the nature of the policy (e.g. whether the policy is targeted to the (raw) agricultural 
commodity (such as price support for grain) or to a processed commodity (such as import tariffs 
on bread or cheese).1 As a consequence, these different agents have sometimes joined forces 
(“political coalitions”) with farmers or with final consumers to influence policy makers in setting 
public policies.  
One of the reasons for simple producer-consumer models is of course its didactic use in 
theory, i.e. to avoid unnecessary complications in economic models to derive policy effects and 
identify equilibria. Another reason is empirical: the absence of detailed empirical information on 
policy impacts on various agents. A major contribution to empirical agricultural and food policy 
analysis in recent years is the World Bank project on “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives”, 
                                                     
1 The distribution of rents or taxes among various agents within the producer and consumer groups depends on various 
factors such as concentration at various stages of the chain, supply and demand elasticities, etc. For instance, it is well 
known that land owners often capture part of the subsidies to farmers and that this capture depends on the nature of 
the subsidies, the supply elasticity of land and market imperfections (e.g.Ciaian and Swinnen 2006; 2009; Goodwin 
et al. 2011; Latruffe and Le Mouël 2009). 
3 
 
coordinated by Kym Anderson. The project resulted in a major new dataset on measures of the 
effects of agricultural and food policies, and a growing number of studies using and explaining 
food policy distortions (e.g. Anderson et al. 2008a; 2008b; 2013; Anderson 2009; Anderson and 
Nelgen 2013; Olper and Swinnen 2013; Olper et al. 2014). The project has made a major 
contribution to empirical analysis by vastly extending the coverage of policy indicators over time 
and across different countries (regions).   
However, as most other projects before, the indicators produced by the project are 
indicators which measure how much “producers” and “consumers” are taxed or subsidized through 
various policies.  The most important indicators are the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture 
(NRA), the real rate of assistance to agriculture (RRA) and the consumer tax equivalent (CTE).   
In these indicators “producers” and “consumers” are a combination of different agents (interest 
groups). Therefore one needs to interpret the numbers carefully (both from an economic and 
political economy perspective) to reach the correct interpretation of the impacts.  
To illustrate this, consider the NRA for a product such as sugar. The NRA is measured as 
the ratio between the domestic price of sugar and the world market price, plus any additional taxes 
and/or subsidies. The NRA for sugar is thus interpreted as how much subsidies “producers” get. 
Inversely, it is interpreted as how much “consumers” get taxed or subsidized (the CTE is the 
negative NRA plus any additional direct consumer taxes or subsidies). But who are these 
“consumers” and “producers”? Since the NRA is measured at the level of sugar, i.e. the processed 
product, the “producers” include both sugar processing companies and the farmers producing sugar 
cane or sugar beet. Other agents, such as land owners and agribusinesses supplying inputs to the 
farmers, may also be affected by the government policies and the impacts on them are also captured 
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in the NRA. This means that it is not clear from the NRA indicator how policies affect specific 
groups, such as farmers. 
The same issue also applies to the “consumer” side. Some sugar is “consumed” directly by 
households, but most is sold to the food industry, which uses the sugar in various products sold to 
retailers and only then households consume the sugar.2 Hence, the impact on all these groups are 
part of the NRA/CTE effects, but the NRA/CTE indicator does not provide specific information 
about each group’s welfare captures impacts.  
In this paper we will try to disentangle some of these distortions/rents among interest 
groups within the “consumer” and “producer” groups. We explicitly consider the impact on several 
groups along the value chain. To do so, we first develop a disaggregated NRA indicator to measure 
these different distortions/rents along the value chain. We then apply this approach to the wheat-
flour chain in Pakistan.3 The wheat-flour value chain in Pakistan is an interesting case since (a) 
wheat is a very important staple food in Pakistan4; (b) Pakistan is a country with significant poverty 
and food insecurity; (c) the government intervenes heavily at various stages of the wheat-flour 
chain, and (d) these interventions have been criticized for being distortionary and ineffective 
(Dorosh and Salam 2007; 2008; 2009; Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013; World Bank, 2010). We 
                                                     
2 For example, in early 2015 the EU’s beverage and confection industries and sweetener companies lined up to 
lobby the EU decision-makers against the extension of the EU sugar quota.  These mostly large food companies are 
included under the “consumer” heading in the indicators.  On the other side of the lobbying campaign are farmers 
and sugar companies – both captured by the “producer” indicator. 
3 Our approach is related to the analysis of Ivanova et al. (1995) and Swinnen (1998) of rents in the wheat-flour 
chain in Bulgaria. 
4 Wheat is the most important agricultural crop and staple food in Pakistan, grown by 80 % of farmers (USDA, 2014). 
Wheat flour consumption per capita in Pakistan is one of the highest in the world, accounting for about 37 % of daily 
caloric consumption (Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013). Hence, both farmer income and food security are to a large extent 
associated with wheat production and consumption, in particular among the many poor. An estimated 17 to 38 % of 
the population is classified as poor and 56 % is considered vulnerable, i.e. being poor or likely to become poor after a 
shock (World Bank 2010). 
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calculate the welfare implications for various agents in the chain for the years 2000 – 2013, a 
period characterized by major price volatility in global wheat and flour markets and by regular 
adjustments of domestic policies.  
2. A Value Chain Approach to Measuring Distortions and Policy Rents 
The NRA measures the extent of distortions to producer and consumer price incentives generated 
by direct and indirect government intervention at the border and in domestic markets. We extend 
the methodology of Anderson (2009) and Anderson et al. (2008a, 2008b) to measure the welfare 
effects for different agents along the value chain. Government policies can affect the welfare of 
agent i in the value chain by changing input prices and/or output prices and/or by providing direct 
subsidies or taxes. The NRA to agent i in a vertical chain is calculated as follows:5  
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑖 =
(𝑝𝑜
𝑖  − 𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗) ∗ 𝑄𝑜
𝑖  + ∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑖∗− 𝑝𝑗
𝑖)𝑗 ∗ 𝑄𝑗
𝑖
𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗ ∗ 𝑄𝑜
𝑖  (1) 
where 𝑝𝑜
𝑖  is the actual domestic price of output o, 𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗ is the ‘undistorted’ domestic output price, 
i.e. the price without government intervention, 𝑄𝑜
𝑖  is the quantity of output sold, 𝑝𝑗
𝑖  is the actual 
domestic price of input j, 𝑝𝑗
𝑖∗ is the ‘undistorted’ domestic price of input j and 𝑄𝑗
𝑖  is the quantity of 
input j used to produce output o.  
 
 
 
                                                     
5 This formula does not include direct subsidies/taxes since these are not relevant for our empirical case. Including 
these, the general formula would be 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑖 =
(𝑝𝑜
𝑖  − 𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗) ∗ 𝑄𝑜
𝑖  + ∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑖∗− 𝑝𝑗
𝑖)𝑗 ∗ 𝑄𝑗
𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖
𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗ ∗ 𝑄𝑜
𝑖    where 𝑧𝑖 represents net direct 
subsidies to agent i. 
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The NRA to agent i can therefore be rewritten as: 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑖 =
𝑝𝑜
𝑖  – 𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗ +
∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑖∗− 𝑝𝑗
𝑖) ∗ 𝑄𝑗
𝑖 𝑄𝑜
𝑖⁄𝑗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗  (2) 
                                                      = 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑖 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑖  
where 𝑄𝐼𝑗
𝑖 /𝑄𝑜
𝑖  represents the conversion rate from input j to output o. The NRA to output, 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑜
𝑖 , 
measures the extent of distortions to output prices expressed as a percentage of the undistorted 
domestic output price. The NRA to input, 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑖 , measures the total extent of distortions to input 
prices for all inputs j used to produce output o, expressed as a percentage of the undistorted output 
price. The total 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑖 to agent i is the sum of both. 
We now apply this approach to the wheat-flour value chain in Pakistan. Before doing the 
calculations we give a brief review of the policies causing distortions and rent distribution in 
Pakistan’s wheat-flour chain.6 
3. Government Policies and the Wheat (Flour) Value Chain in Pakistan  
Figure 1 shows international and Pakistan wheat prices for the period 1994-2013. The correlation 
coefficient is 77 %, but Pakistan’s wheat prices were less volatile than international wheat prices. 
This reduced volatility was the result of government interventions. 
The Wheat Price Stabilization Scheme 
Since the 1960s, the wheat and flour markets have been heavily regulated by the 
government through the Wheat Price Stabilization Scheme, which entails both domestic market 
                                                     
6 For more details see Dorosh and Salam (2007; 2008); International Finance Corporation (2011); Lohano, Smith, and 
Stockbridge (1998); Prikhodko and Zrilyi (2013), Ahmad, Qayyum, and Iqbal (2005), USAID (2009) and Zahid et al. 
(2007). 
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interventions and trade policies.7 The government procures wheat from farmers at the support or 
procurement price and sells procured wheat to flour millers at the release or issue price. 
Government wheat procurement at the support price is intended to increase wheat production and 
support farmer incomes in post-harvest price depressions. Increasing domestic wheat production 
has also been seen as a means of improving overall national food security by limiting the reliance 
on wheat (flour) imports. The distribution of wheat to flour mills at the subsidized release price, 
in combination with the formulation of ceiling prices for ex-mill wheat flour, are intended to ensure 
the availability of wheat flour at affordable prices to urban areas and to maintain price stability.  
In the past, Pakistan was a wheat-deficit country with domestic production typically 
accounting for about 90 % of availability. The government controlled wheat trade through the 
Trading Corporation of Pakistan and did not allow private sector wheat imports until 2000 
(Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013). Imports of wheat were used to supplement domestic production with 
the aim of stabilizing domestic supply and prices.8   
The main buyers of wheat are the government and private sector wheat traders. Provincial 
Food Departments purchase wheat from farmers at the support price to support farmer incomes. 9 
To ensure that Food Departments meet their targets, a ban may be placed on inter-provincial wheat 
                                                     
7 Wheat in Pakistan is mainly produced in the Punjab and Sindh province: in the period FY1992 – FY2012 (fiscal 
years) Punjab accounted for 76 % and Sindh for 14 % of national wheat production. The remaining 10 % is produced 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Wheat is grown primarily by small (0.5 to 5 ha) and medium-sized (5 to 10 
ha) farmers. On average, about 40 % of production is retained at the farm for seed, in-kind labour payments and 
household food consumption. As a result, about 60 % of wheat production enters the market (Dorosh and Salam, 2008; 
International Finance Corporation 2011; Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013).  
8 PASSCO is a federal institute responsible for nation-wide procurement and distribution of wheat and is specifically 
in charge of supplying wheat to deficit zones (i.e. Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and to the military forces. 
Since the 2000s, the government has been procuring on average about 40 % of the marketable surplus, or 23 % of 
national production (see Figure A1, Appendix 4). 
9 The wheat crop marketing year runs from May to April the following year. Most wheat in Pakistan is harvested in 
March and April and sowing takes place in September-December. 
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trade and the private sector is not allowed to engage in large-scale wheat purchases and storage 
until government procurement has ended.10  
Procured wheat supplemented with public wheat imports is sold to flour mills at below-
market rates, i.e. the release price. Large (urban) mills tend to supplement government wheat by 
wheat purchases on the open market. The price of flour processed from subsidized wheat is also 
regulated by the government through ceiling prices to lower consumer prices. However, Dorosh 
and Salam (2008:76) argue that: “[a]lthough there may be a stipulated sales price of flour, there is 
no effective enforcement mechanism. Since wheat flour produced from government wheat is not 
distinguishable from wheat flour produced from market wheat, their prices are the same.”.11 Flour 
mills that receive subsidized wheat from the government can therefore enjoy large rents from sales 
of subsidized wheat flour at market prices. Lohano, Smith, and Stockbridge (1998) and Ahmad, 
Qayyum, and Iqbal (2005) argue that this policy offers considerable opportunities for rent-seeking 
and has resulted in  a considerable excess capacity in the flour milling industry.12  
 
 
                                                     
10 Exceptions are made for flour mills – the major processors of wheat – and local traders, known as Aarthis and 
Beoparis. Beoparis are village traders that are in direct contact with farmers and are responsible for wheat purchases 
at the farmgate. Aarthis are commission agents that deal in large quantities of wheat and contract Beoparis to 
assemble these quantities. Wheat purchased at the farm by Beoparis is packed and delivered to the Aarthis, who sell 
the assembled quantities on the wholesale market to flour millers or stockists. Most small and medium-sized farmers 
sell their produce to wheat traders; self-marketing is only a marginal phenomenon. 
11 See also IFC (2011) and Prikhodko and Zrilyi (2013). 
12 In a reaction to the food crisis the government also sells wheat flour at subsidized prices 10 to 20 % lower than 
market prices to consumers through the Utility Stores Corporation system (USC) but in reality the impact of this 
program seems marginal (World Bank 2010 and Khan and Akhtar Ali Shah 2011). The geographical coverage is 
limited, there is no targeting and the amount allowed per family is only 5 kg/month compared to an average per capita 
wheat consumption of around 10.5 kg per person per month .12 FAO et al. (2008) also indicate that Utility Stores face 
problems of queues, long waiting hours and unreliable supply. 
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Policies and Trade in the 2000s 
Trade policies shifted back and forth in the 2000s. After a bumper harvest in 2000 (see Figure A1, 
Appendix 4) the government started to subsidize public and private exports of wheat.13 As a result, 
Pakistan became a net wheat exporter in the early 2000s.14 However, in 2003 the government 
imposed an export ban on wheat and wheat flour (although informal wheat (flour) exports 
continued) (Persaud, 2013). In October 2005 the government liberalized private sector imports and 
removed the tariff on wheat imports (Dorosh and Salam, 2008). In April 2007 the government 
lifted the export ban on wheat (flour) that had been in place since 2003, but was not well enforced, 
and permitted 500 thousand tonnes of private sector wheat exports (Dorosh, 2008; Persaud, 2010). 
However, as international wheat prices surged, the government reinstated the export ban 
for wheat and wheat flour a month later (in May 2007) and started importing large quantities of 
wheat.15 Despite this intervention and a 2007 record harvest, domestic wheat prices rose about 71 
%. Yet, Figure 1 shows that the domestic price rise was not nearly as great as the surge in 
international prices in 2007/08. The gap between state controlled prices in Pakistan and 
international wheat prices created incentives for the private sector to informally export wheat 
(flour) to Afghanistan. It is estimated that about 1.5 to 2 million tonnes of wheat flour were illegally 
                                                     
13 Afghanistan is the main destination of wheat flour exports from Pakistan. In the period 2003-2013 over 90 % of 
Pakistan wheat flour exports flowed to Afghanistan (UN Comtrade database 2014).13 Pakistan is also the dominant 
supplier of wheat to Afghanistan, covering on average 65 % of Afghanistan’s import requirements (USDA, 2012a).  
14 When referring to net imports and exports, we take into account both wheat and wheat flour trade. Wheat flour 
imports and exports are converted to wheat equivalents using an extraction factor of 0.77. This rate is calculated by 
taking a simple average of the extraction rate of Atta (82 %) and Maida (72 %) flour (Tayyab, 2013; USDA, 2012b). 
Wheat flour imports mostly involve humanitarian aid and food aid (Prikhodko, 2013). 
15 The reintroduction of the export ban in May 2007 did not apply to exports to Afghanistan. In early 2008, however, 
the government extended the export ban to Afghanistan (Persaud, 2010). 
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exported to Afghanistan during the food price shock in spite of the official export ban, pushing up 
domestic prices (USDA, 2014b; World Bank, 2010).  
Another possible explanation for rising domestic prices is widespread hoarding behaviour 
of grain, as the private sector expected the government to increase the wheat support price (Tayyab, 
2013; World Bank, 2010). In fact, the support price did increase by 62 % between July 2007 and 
July 2009.16  
Pakistan was hit by severe floods in 2010 and 2011, but in both years the floods had little 
impact on wheat production as the wheat crop was already harvested (USDA, 2011). In fact, the 
2010 harvest was only 3 % lower than the record harvest of 2009 and the 2011 harvest reached a 
record level of 25 million tons.  
Despite international wheat prices rising again in mid-2010, the wheat (flour) export ban 
was lifted in December 2010 and exports reached a record level in 2010/11 at 1.7 million tonnes 
of wheat and 1.2 million tonnes of wheat flour. In the next two years, wheat and particularly flour 
exports remained large. As a result, Pakistan again became a net wheat (flour) exporter in these 
years. 
Summary 
Extensive government interventions in wheat markets and trade caused domestic markets and 
prices to diverge from international markets and prices, but the extent (and even the nature) of the 
price difference varied significantly over the two decades.17 In fact, in recent years Pakistani prices 
                                                     
16 In 2008/09, the government imported even larger quantities of wheat (3.1 million tons) to offset a disappointing 
2008 harvest and high support prices resulted in a bountiful 2009 wheat harvest. Nevertheless, domestic prices further 
increased as net domestic wheat availability declined due to massive government procurement and modest releases. 
17 Table A1 in Appendix 4 provides a summary of wheat policies and markets in Pakistan in the past decades. 
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and international wheat prices were relatively close, and the volatility of domestic prices through 
the past decade was much lower than world market prices. Pieters and Swinnen (2014) conclude 
that Pakistan’s wheat policies have performed “relatively well” compared to other countries if one 
takes into account price stability as an explicit government objective. Of course, such policy 
interventions may still have important redistribution effects. In the next section we use the value 
chain NRA disaggregation to measure who benefitted from these interventions. 
4. NRAs along the Value Chain 
Using the general formula (2), we calculate the NRA at the level of (a) wheat farmers, (b) wheat 
traders, (c) wheat flour millers, and (d) wheat flour consumers. 
The NRA to the wheat sector captures the cumulative rate of assistance to farmers (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑓) 
and wheat traders (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑡), or the nominal rate of assistance to wheat 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑤. 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑤 = 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑓 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑡 (3) 
where   
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑓 = 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑓 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑓
 (4) 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑡 = 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑡 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑡 (5) 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑓 =
𝑝𝑜
𝑓
 − 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗  (6) 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑓 =
∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑓∗
− 𝑝𝑗
𝑓
) ∗ 𝑄𝑗
𝑓
/𝑄𝑜
𝑓
𝑗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗  (7) 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑡 =
𝑝𝑜
𝑡  − 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗  (8) 
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 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑡 =
∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑡∗− 𝑝𝑗
𝑡) ∗ 𝑄𝑗
𝑡/𝑄𝑜
𝑡
𝑗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗  (9) 
This implies that 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑤 =
𝑝𝑜
𝑓
 − 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗ +
∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑓∗
− 𝑝𝑗
𝑓
) ∗ 𝑄𝑗
𝑓
/𝑄𝑜
𝑓
𝑗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗ +
𝑝𝑜
𝑡  − 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗ +
∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑡∗− 𝑝𝑗
𝑡) ∗ 𝑄𝑗
𝑡/𝑄𝑜
𝑡
𝑗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗  (10) 
For wheat traders, both input and output are wheat and hence 𝑄𝑜
𝑡= 𝑄𝑗
𝑡. The formula to calculate 
wheat trader input 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑡 then becomes:  
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑡 =
(𝑝𝐼
𝑡∗− 𝑝𝐼
𝑡)
 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗  (11) 
Given that the output price received by farmers equals the input price paid by wheat traders, or 
𝑝𝑜
𝑓 = 𝑝𝐼
𝑡 and 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗ = 𝑝𝐼
𝑡∗, equation (12) can be written as: 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑤 =
𝑝𝑜
𝑓
 − 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗ +
∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑓∗
− 𝑝𝑗
𝑓
) ∗ 𝑄𝑗
𝑓
/𝑄𝑜
𝑓
𝑗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗ +
𝑝𝑜
𝑡  − 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗
 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗ +
𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗
 − 𝑝𝑜
𝑓
 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗  (12) 
NRA to wheat farmer input (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑓
) 
The second term in equation (12) captures the NRA to farm input 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑓
. Earlier World Bank 
estimates (Anderson and Nelgen, 2013) assumed that the NRA to farm input for wheat was zero 
from 2006 to 2010 (see Table A2, Appendix 4). However, the implicit subsidy to urea and DAP 
was likely non-trivial after 2005, in particular during the international food price shock.18 We 
                                                     
18 According to a recent IFPRI policy report (Salam, 2012: 9-10): “… the cost of domestically produced urea has 
been less than the imported price due to the subsidized gas supply to the fertilizer industry. Since both imported and 
local fertilizers are sold at the same rate, the government has to subsidize the imported urea, the import of which has 
recently been confined in the public sector to the Trading Corporation of Pakistan. […] Accordingly, there has been 
an implicit element of subsidy in the sales price and use of these fertilizers [urea and DAP] throughout the reference 
period.” Moreover, a report by the World Bank (2010:129) similarly states that in the 2007/08 fiscal year “ 
[f]ertilizer subsidies (mainly on di-ammonium phosphate or DAP) also became an increasingly large fiscal burden 
because of increased world market prices”. The use of urea and DAP accounted for about 93 % of total fertilizer cost 
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account for this implicit subsidy by calculating the NRA to urea and DAP fertilizer for 2000-2013 
and adding it to the NRA to farmer output.19 Our calculated NRA to fertilizer approaches the 
World Bank estimates of the NRA to farm input reasonably well for the years in which the World 
Bank estimates are non-zero.20  
NRA to wheat trader output (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑡 ) 
The third term in equation (12) captures the NRA to wheat trader output 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑡 . The government 
procures on average about 40 % of marketed wheat nation-wide and may supplement procured 
wheat with public wheat imports. The government sells wheat to flour millers at the release price, 
which is on average lower than the wholesale price of wheat (see Figure A3, Appendix 4). We use 
the price of wheat at the Lahore wholesale market as an indicator for 𝑝𝑜
𝑡 .  
For the undistorted wholesale price of wheat 𝑝𝑜
𝑡∗ one should use the border price measured 
at the Lahore wholesale market. Dorosh and Salam (2007) argue that in many years domestic 
wheat prices in Pakistan would likely lie between import and export parity prices in the absence 
of government interventions. Hence, the conventional approach of using import (export) parity 
prices as border prices for wheat will understate (overstate) the nominal rate of assistance in certain 
years. They use estimated autarky (no trade) prices as the border price when the autarky price is 
below import parity. We follow the methodology of Dorosh and Salam (2007), except that import 
                                                     
and 22 % of total farmer production costs per acre in the last two wheat crop years (author’s calculations based on 
API data). 
19 Although the NRA to fertilizer does not take into account government assistance to other important inputs such as 
water, Dorosh and Salam (2007) argue that it captures the major distortion to non-factor agricultural input prices in 
Pakistan. Details on the calculation of the NRA to farmer input are provided in Appendix 1. 
20 For 2000-2005, the average difference is equal to 0.2 percentage points, or about 7.5 % of the World Bank 
average NRA to farm input for 2000-2005. 
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and export parity prices were calculated using Lahore as the reference market rather than 
Karachi.21 We also follow their methodology in calculating autarky prices based on the Dorosh-
Salam dataset (extended with more recently collected data).22  
NRA to wheat farmer output (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑓
) and wheat trader input (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑡) 
We use the border price for wheat measured at the farmgate in Lahore as an indicator of the 
undistorted farmgate price for wheat 𝑝𝑜
𝑓∗
. Import parity, export parity and autarky prices measured 
at the farmgate are equal to the import parity, export parity and autarky price measured at the 
Lahore wholesale market minus marketing costs from the farmgate to the Lahore wholesale 
market. Wheat trader input distortions, 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑡 , are the counterpart of wheat farmer output 
distortions. 
The price that traders pay to farmers – the farmgate price – is the measure for 𝑝𝑜
𝑓
 ( = 𝑝𝐼
𝑡 ). 
However, data on farmgate prices are not available for Pakistan. We have therefore calculated an 
indicator for farmgate prices under two assumptions. In the first approach, we assume that wheat 
traders pay farmers the support price set by the government. Kurosaki (1996, cited in Ahmad et 
al., 2005) for example concludes, after examining the spatial and intertemporal price relations of 
grains in the Punjab province, that in the case of wheat the farmgate price is explained mostly by 
the support price. Another interpretation of this assumption is that the support price is the price 
received by farmers when selling wheat to the government during the procurement season. Note 
                                                     
21 The import parity price for wheat measured at the wholesale market in Lahore equals the C&F Karachi price plus 
import costs and marketing costs from Karachi to the wholesale market in Lahore. The export parity price for wheat 
at the wholesale market in Lahore equals the FOB Karachi price minus export costs and marketing costs from 
Lahore to Karachi. The calculation of border prices for wheat is described in more detail in Appendix 2. 
22 Table A3 in Appendix 4 shows the border price (import parity, export parity or autarky price) used for each year 
(for all agents in the value chain). 
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that in this case fluctuations of the wholesale price of wheat are passed on entirely to wheat traders 
and do not affect farmers.  
In the second approach we assume that wheat traders pay farmers the wholesale price of 
wheat at Lahore minus marketing costs from the farmgate to the wholesale market in Lahore. In 
this case, the trader marketing margin is assumed to be fixed and fluctuations of the wholesale 
wheat price are passed on entirely to farmers.23 
Figure 2 shows that the real wholesale price (minus marketing costs) fluctuates according 
to the wheat season: wholesale prices generally fall in the months following the wheat harvest and 
increase towards the winter. In most of the 1990s, 2004-2006 and 2008, the wholesale price minus 
marketing costs exceeded the support price throughout the year, including in the months following 
the harvest. Hence, in these years farmers would be better off receiving the wholesale price minus 
marketing costs throughout the year, as they would be capturing the rents of higher wholesale 
prices. In other years, the wholesale price minus marketing costs falls below the support price 
during post-harvest months. Hence, in these years farmers would be better off receiving the support 
price in post-harvest months. 
NRA to flour mills  
When calculating the NRA to flour mills (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑚), we assume that wheat grain is their only input24:  
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑚 =
𝑝𝑜
𝑚−𝑝𝑜
𝑚∗
𝑝𝑜
𝑚∗ +
(𝑝𝐼
𝑚∗−𝑝𝐼
𝑚)∗𝑄𝐼
𝑚/𝑄𝑜
𝑚
𝑝𝑜
𝑚∗  (13) 
                                                     
23 Data used for the calculation of the NRA to wheat farmers and wheat traders are presented in Tables A3 and A4 in 
Appendix 4. 
24 Wheat purchases account for approximately 90 % of production costs of flour milling (Prikhodko and Rybchynsky 
(2009) and author’s calculations based on data from International Finance Corporation (2011)). We therefore abstract 
from possible government assistance to other inputs such as electricity, fuel or water. 
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                                          =   𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑚 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑚 
where 𝑝𝑜
𝑚  is the price of wheat flour received by flour millers, 𝑝𝑜
𝑚∗ is the undistorted price of 
wheat flour received by flour millers, 𝑝𝐼
𝑚 is the price of wheat paid to traders (or the government) 
and 𝑝𝐼
𝑚∗ is the undistorted price of wheat paid to traders. 𝑄𝑜
𝑚 is the quantity of wheat flour sold 
and 𝑄𝐼
𝑚 the quantity of wheat purchased by flour millers. Hence, 𝑄𝐼
𝑚/𝑄𝑜
𝑚 is the conversion rate of 
wheat to wheat flour.  
NRA to miller input (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑚) 
We use the border price for wheat at the wholesale market in Lahore as an indicator for the 
undistorted wholesale wheat price 𝑝𝐼
𝑚∗ and a weighted average of the release price and the price 
of wheat on the wholesale market in Lahore as an indicator for 𝑝𝐼
𝑚. The weights are equal to the 
annual share of government releases and marketed wheat in the total domestic wheat supply 
(marketed wheat produce plus net government injections). We set the extraction rate of wheat flour 
milling (𝑄𝐼
𝑚/𝑄𝑜
𝑚) to 82 %.25 
The indicator for the undistorted price of wheat flour 𝑝𝑜
𝑚∗ is the border price for wheat 
flour. Appendix 3 describes the methodology used to calculate import and export parity prices and 
autarky prices for wheat flour, using Lahore as the reference market. For the import parity price, 
two sets of prices are calculated. The first assumes that Pakistan would import wheat flour from 
Kazakhstan, while the second assumes that Pakistan would import wheat flour from the EU or 
Black Sea region. 
                                                     
25 This is the extraction rate for Atta flour (82 %). Throughout the analysis we use domestic prices for Atta flour, 
which is the main type of flour consumed in Pakistan (USDA 2012b).  
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Kazakhstan is one of the largest exporters of wheat flour globally and the main supplier of 
wheat flour in Central and South Asia. For instance, Kazakhstan is the major competitor of 
Pakistan in the Afghan wheat flour market, generally supplying 20 % of Afghan wheat flour 
imports mostly to the north of Afghanistan. If Kazakh wheat flour exports reach Afghanistan, we 
assume that they could reach Pakistan as well if Pakistan would start importing wheat flour 
commercially. As Kazakhstan is also one of the most competitive wheat flour producers, the first 
set of border prices assumes that Pakistan would import wheat flour from Kazakhstan.  
However, wheat flour exports from Kazakhstan to Pakistan would be transported over land 
across a far distance, substantially increasing the calculated cost of wheat flour imports from 
Kazakhstan. In the past, humanitarian and food aid in the form of wheat flour imports into Pakistan 
came mostly from the European Union and Black Sea region. A calculation of the price of wheat 
flour imports from this area showed that Pakistan could in fact import wheat flour at a lower cost 
from the EU and Black Sea region compared to Kazakhstan, due to the large differences in ocean 
freight costs and land freight costs.26  For this reason, we have calculated an alternative set of 
border prices which assumes that Pakistan would import wheat flour from the European Union 
and Black Sea region, rather than from Kazakhstan.  
Here we only report results for the NRA to flour millers and flour consumers using 
EU/Black Sea import parity prices, as we have deemed this scenario the most plausible. In any 
case, the choice of import parity prices is only relevant in years where the border price is the import 
                                                     
26 The cost of wheat flour imports was calculated as the international wheat flour reference price (see Appendix 3) 
plus average transportation costs from the Kazakh border to Lahore for the first set of prices, and plus average 
transportation costs from the European Union-Black Sea region to Lahore for the second set of border prices. 
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parity price; for export parity and autarky prices only one set of prices is used in the calculations 
(see Appendix 3 for more details and alternative assumptions).  
NRA to miller output (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂
𝑚) 
The government of Pakistan directly intervenes in the wholesale market for wheat flour by setting 
ceiling prices for sales of flour milled from government wheat. However, as was discussed in 
section 3.1, flour milled from government wheat cannot be distinguished from flour milled from 
open market wheat. As a result these ceiling prices are not enforced (Dorosh and Salam, 2008). 
We therefore assume that all wheat flour is sold at the market price and use the wholesale price of 
wheat flour in Lahore as an indicator for 𝑝𝑜
𝑚.27  
NRA to flour consumers (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑐) 
The NRA to wheat flour consumers is calculated as follows28: 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑐 =
(𝑝𝐼
𝑐∗−𝑝𝐼
𝑐)
𝑝𝐼
𝑐∗  (14) 
                                                     
27Monthly data for the wholesale price of wheat flour was only available from FY2009 onwards. We have therefore 
used annual wholesale prices of wheat flour for the period FY2001-FY2008. 
28 The consumer tax equivalent (CTE) of Anderson et al. (2008a) captures the effect of distortions on price incentives 
of final consumers expressed as a percentage of the undistorted consumer price. The CTE can be calculated as follows: 
 𝐶𝑇𝐸 =
(𝑝𝐼 − 𝑝𝐼
∗) ∗ 𝑄𝐼
𝑝𝐼
∗ ∗ 𝑄𝐼
  
where input I represents the commodity purchased for consumption, 𝑝𝐼  is the actual domestic consumer price, 𝑝𝐼
∗ is 
the undistorted domestic consumer price and 𝑄𝐼  equals the quantity consumed. The NRA for the final consumer relates 
as follows to the consumer tax equivalent (CTE) of Anderson et al. (2008a): 
 𝐶𝑇𝐸 = − 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑐 = − 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑐  
for i = c for the final consumer for whom 𝑄𝑜
𝑐 = 0 and thus 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑂 = 0.  
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where 𝑝𝐼 is the domestic price of wheat flour paid by consumers and 𝑝𝐼
∗ is the undistorted wheat 
flour price paid by consumers. We use the border price of wheat flour at the retail market in Lahore 
as an indicator for 𝑝𝐼
∗. This border price should be calculated by adding marketing costs of retailers 
to the border price of flour measured at the wholesale market. As information on retailer marketing 
costs was lacking, we have estimated an upper and lower boundary of the actual border price at 
the retail market. The upper boundary border price is calculated under the assumption that retailer 
marketing costs are equal to the price margin between the wholesale price and retail price of wheat 
flour, i.e. that retailer marketing margins are zero. The lower boundary border price is calculated 
under the assumption that retailer marketing costs are zero, i.e. that retailer marketing margins are 
equal to the price margin. The actual border price measured at the retail market will lie in between 
these boundaries, and the actual NRA to flour consumers will probably be in between the resulting 
upper boundary and lower boundary NRA.29 
The government directly intervenes in the retail market for wheat flour through the Utility 
Stores Corporation, which sells wheat flour at subsidized prices to consumers. However, the 
effectiveness of the Utility Stores system is not clear.  Moreover, data series on subsidized prices 
or the share of wheat flour sold through Utility Stores were not available. We therefore use the 
price of wheat flour at the retail market in Lahore as an indicator for the domestic price 𝑝𝐼 . 
However, our disregarding of the consumer subsidy provided by the Utility Stores will lead us to 
overestimate consumer taxation or underestimate consumer subsidization. A quick, back-of-the-
                                                     
29 Data used for the calculation of the NRA to flour millers and flour consumers are presented in Tables A5 and A6 
in Appendix 4. 
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envelope calculation suggests that the additional NRA to consumers from the Utility Store sales 
in recent years may be around 3 to 8 %. 
5. Results 
The results are summarized in Figures 3 to 7 and Table 1. Table 1 presents the average NRA for 
different agents along the value chain across 2000 – 2013 and for 3 sub-periods: 2000-2004, 2005-
2008 and 2009-2013.  
5.1.“Producers”: Wheat farmers and wheat traders 
Figure 3 and Table 1 present the NRA to “producers”, i.e. the NRA to the wheat sector, which 
equals the sum of the NRAs to wheat farmers and wheat traders. The NRA to wheat farmers and 
wheat traders are given for both farmgate price indicators (support price and wholesale price minus 
trader marketing costs). Figure 4 presents the NRA to wheat farmers and wheat traders for 
alternative farmgate price indicators. Figure 5 shows the NRA to wheat traders disaggregated into 
the total NRA and the NRA to trader input and output. 
 The average NRA to the wheat sector for 2000-2013 equals - 9 %, indicating that the wheat 
sector as a whole is on average taxed. In fact, throughout the period the NRA to wheat is positive 
only in 2005/06 and in 2010/11 at 18 % and 11 %. Wheat sector taxation was - 20 % in the sub-
period 2000-2004. The NRA reaches a minimum in 2007/08 at - 25 % during the international 
food price shock, when the wheat sector as a whole is taxed most heavily. In more recent years, 
taxation has fallen significantly: in the sub-period 2009-2013 it is at its lowest level at - 2 %. In 
2011/12 and 2012/13 the NRA is close to zero.  
 
 
21 
 
Wheat traders 
The distribution of the NRA between wheat traders and farmers depends strongly on the 
assumption on the best indicator of the farmgate price, i.e. to what extent the trader’s margin 
changes with changing wholesale prices.  
In the extreme case that the traders’ margin is fixed, i.e. traders pay farmers the wholesale 
price minus marketing costs, there is very little policy impact on the traders. In other words, 
fluctuations in wheat prices do not affect the NRA to traders. The difference between the domestic 
input and output price for wheat traders is assumed equal to marketing costs from the farmgate to 
Lahore, which is equal to the difference between the border price at the farmgate and at the 
wholesale market. Hence, the NRAs to wheat trader input and output cancel each other out, 
producing an NRA equal to zero. 
 However, if traders pay farmers the support price, they capture the rents created by 
fluctuations of their sales price, i.e. the wheat price on the wholesale market. The NRA to traders 
is then positive or zero throughout the period and slightly below zero in 2011/12 and 2012/13. In 
this case, the net subsidy to wheat traders for the period 2000-2013 is 6 %, with subsidization being 
highest in the sub-period 2005-2008 at 10 % and lowest in 2009-2013 at 4 %. The overall net 
subsidization of wheat traders is a result of two opposing policy effects. Traders are generally 
taxed on output by policies reducing their sales price, but benefit from policies lowering the price 
they pay to farmers and the second effect is strongest. 
 Traders are taxed on their output side as the price they receive for wheat sales would be 
higher in case the government would not intervene to adjust domestic supply. At the same time, 
traders are subsidized on the input side as the support price they pay to farmers is lower than the 
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price they would pay in the absence of government interventions.30 Our calculations indicate that 
the subsidy to inputs exceeds the tax on output, and the result is a net subsidization of wheat traders 
for most of the 2000s.  
Interestingly, if traders had to pay farmers the support price, this net subsidy effect would 
have been the highest at the point when overall taxation of the wheat sector was strongest. In 
2007/08, at the height of the international food price shock, the government responded to rising 
prices by imposing an export ban and supplementing domestic production with large-scale imports 
at below-market rates. The government thereby prevented domestic prices from rising to the same 
extent as international prices. The result was a large gap between the export parity price and 
domestic prices and a considerable taxation of wheat trader output. Even though domestic 
wholesale prices did not follow international prices, they did increase, and the rents would have 
been captured entirely by wheat traders as a subsidy on their inputs (when paying the support price 
to farmers). This subsidy exceeded the tax on their output and resulted in a net subsidization of 13 
% in 2007/08 and a period maximum of 17 % in 2008/09.  
From 2009/10 onwards, the NRA to wheat traders moves close to zero as the gap between 
domestic prices and border prices decreases. That is, traders are paying and receiving a price that 
is very close to the hypothetical price in a no-distortions scenario. In 2009/10, domestic prices had 
risen to high levels and were close to import parity. In late 2010, the export ban on wheat (flour) 
was lifted and as domestic prices were below export parity, large wheat (flour) exports ensued. In 
                                                     
30 In 2005/06 and 2010/11 the general situation is reversed: traders are taxed on input and subsidized on output. For 
2005/06, this is explained by the fact that the border price (autarky price) was lower than domestic wheat prices and 
in fact close to export parity due to a bountiful harvest in 2005 (see Figure A4 in Appendix 4). For 2010/11, the 
explanation is the switch from import parity in 2009/10 to export parity in 2010/11 and the fact that export parity was 
below domestic prices until 2011. 
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the following years, liberalized wheat trade likely contributed to keeping domestic prices near 
export parity. In 2011/12 and 2012/13, the NRA to wheat traders is slightly negative because the 
subsidy to inputs falls close to zero. 
Wheat farmers 
Obviously, since wheat traders and wheat farmers effectively share the effects on the wheat sector 
as a whole, the assumption on the farmgate price has the opposite implications for wheat farmers. 
With fixed trader margins, the NRA to wheat farmers is equal to the NRA to “producers” (i.e. the 
wheat sector as a whole), as the NRA to traders is zero. If trader margins fluctuate in response to 
changing prices (i.e. farmers receive the support price) the impacts on the farmers will be more 
negative than for the wheat sector, as the benefits of higher wholesale prices are captured by traders 
instead of the farmers.  
Our calculations indicate that wheat farmers were generally taxed by government policies 
in 2000-2013, regardless of the indicator used for the farmgate price.31 When farmers receive the 
wholesale price minus marketing costs and thus fully capture wholesale wheat price fluctuations, 
the tax is on average 9 % for the whole period. When farmers effectively receive the support price 
instead, the average tax increases to 15 % for 2000-2013.  
The NRA to farmers fluctuates considerably across years. The extent of taxation is largest 
in 2007/08, during the spike in international wheat prices, with the NRA between - 24 % 
                                                     
31 In 2005/06 and 2010/11 farmers were exceptionally subsidized. The explanation is analogous to the explanation 
provided for trader NRAs in these years (cf. supra). For instance, the large positive NRA in 2010/11 is explained by 
a switch of the border price from import to export parity in May 2010, and the fact that the export parity price was far 
below domestic wheat prices until late 2010-early 2011 (see Figure A2 in Appendix 4).   
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(wholesale price indicator) and - 37 % (support price indicator).32 The large increase in the tax on 
farmers during the food price shock was driven by the strong increase of the border price above 
domestic wheat prices. As the government prevented domestic prices from rising by imposing a 
ban on wheat (flour) exports and releasing large quantities of subsidized wheat on the market, 
farmers were receiving a substantially lower price than what they would have received in a no-
distortions scenario. 
In spite of the peak in farmer taxation during the food price spike, average farmer taxation 
is highest in the sub-period before the food price crisis: the average NRA was - 20 % to - 25 % in 
2000-2004, compared to - 7 to - 18 % in 2005-2008. Average farmer taxation was lowest in recent 
years: in the sub-period 2009-2013 it was between - 2 % to - 6 %. 
The shift from large farmer taxation in the 2000s to NRAs close to zero in 2012-2013 can 
be explained by the same factors as the shift in the NRA to traders. As domestic support and 
wholesale prices fluctuated around the export parity price, the NRA increased to close to zero. The 
convergence of domestic and export parity prices of wheat can be explained by the fact that (1) 
the export parity price had increased to a higher average level following the international price 
rises in mid-2010 and mid-2012, approaching high domestic wheat flour prices; (2) the 
government allowed private sector wheat (flour) exports in late 2010 and (3) Pakistan became a 
net wheat exporter from 2010/11 onwards. The resulting market forces likely pushed domestic 
prices towards export parity in 2011-2013. 
                                                     
32 In general, the tax on farmers is larger for the support price indicator, as the support price is on average lower than 
the wholesale price minus marketing costs. However, in 2011/2012 and 2012/13 the NRAs are nearly equal in size for 
both indicators. The support price was increased to such an extent since 2007/08 that the average gap between the two 
farmgate price indicators has become small in recent years, reducing the difference between the corresponding NRAs 
(see Figure A2 in Appendix 4). 
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Seasonality of wheat prices 
So far we have ignored the seasonality of wheat prices. Although the support price is lower than 
the wholesale price indicator on average, it is frequently higher in the months immediately 
following the harvest (see Figure 2). Hence, in various years farmers are better off selling to the 
government in the months following the harvest. According to Dorosh and Salam (2008), a large 
part of total marketed wheat is sold by farmers within four months of the wheat harvest. To see 
the impact of this on the results, one can look at the monthly NRA’s for the post-harvest months. 
Even if one assumes that all wheat is sold in the post-harvest months (April-August), the average 
tax on farmers over the period 2000-2013 is 10 % compared to 9% to 15% if one takes the annual 
average.33  Hence the impact of the seasonality on the farm taxation is limited.  
5.2.  “Consumers”: Flour mills and flour consumers 
Figure 3 and Table 1 show the NRA to “consumers” as a whole. The average NRA to “consumers” 
is calculated as the sum of the NRA to flour mills and the average NRA to flour consumers (the 
average of the NRAs for lower and upper bound border prices). Figure 6 and Table 1 present the 
NRA to flour mills and flour consumers. The NRA to flour consumers is reported for both the 
upper and lower bound border prices. Figure 7 shows the NRA to miller input (wheat) and output 
(flour).  
                                                     
33 Only in 2010/11 are farmers subsidized when looking at post-harvest months. The average tax on farmers is the 
same (NRA = -10%) for  2000-2013 regardless of the support price or wholesale price indicator used. This is because 
the average support price indicator for post-harvest months in 2000-2013 is equal to the average post-harvest 
wholesale price indicator (about 14 Rs/kg). In the sub-period 2000-2004, the average post-harvest support price is 
slightly higher and consequently farmer taxation slightly lower compared to the wholesale price indicator, while in 
the sub-period 2005-2008 the reverse holds: the average post-harvest support price is lower than the average post-
harvest wholesale price indicator (9.94 versus 10.42 Rs/kg). On average, these differences cancel each other out. 
Detailed results are available on request. 
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The average NRA to “consumers” is 5 % for 2000-2013, indicating that consumers as a 
whole are on average subsidized across the entire period. Average subsidization is highest in the 
subperiods 2000-2004 and 2005-2008 at 7 %. However, in recent years subsidization of consumers 
as a whole declines, with average subsidization lowest in 2009-2013 at 1 %.  
The NRA to “consumers” can be broken down into the NRA to flour mills and the NRA to 
companies and households that purchase wheat flour, i.e. flour consumers.  
Flour mills 
Regardless of the type of import parity price used (Kazakhstan or EU/Black Sea import parities),  
flour mills are generally taxed by existing government policies in 2000-2013. However, the size 
of taxation is limited: the average NRA over the period 2000-2013 is - 4 %. Taxation was highest 
in the sub-period 2000-2004 at 9 %. In the sub-period 2005-2008 the average NRA becomes 
slightly positive at 1 %. In recent years flour millers are again taxed: the average NRA falls back 
to – 4 % in the sub-period 2009-2013. This overall taxation is driven by the fact that the tax on 
flour output on average exceeds the subsidy on wheat input.  
Flour mills are taxed on flour output throughout the period.34 This taxation is explained by 
the fact that domestic wholesale flour prices are substantially lower than flour border prices (see 
Figure A3, Appendix 4). On the input side, the NRA to flour millers is positive throughout the 
period (except for 2005/06 and 2010/11). This subsidy to wheat input is driven by two prices: the 
price of wheat on the wholesale market and the government release price.35 The wheat border price 
                                                     
34 Except in 2005/06, due to the fact that the autarky price dropped after a bountiful 2006 harvest and was lower than 
the domestic wheat flour price (see Figure A5 in Appendix 4). 
35 This subsidy is the counterpart of the taxation of wheat trader output. 
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is higher than both prices, and the millers get extra rents from the fact that the release price is lower 
than the wheat price on the wholesale market.36 
In some years, this ‘double’ subsidy to wheat input is sufficiently large so as to compensate 
the tax on flour output, resulting in a net subsidization of flour millers. However, in most years the 
gap between domestic flour prices and flour border prices (output) is larger than the gap between 
domestic wheat prices and wheat border prices (input), resulting in a (limited) net taxation of flour 
millers. 
At the height of the food price crisis in 2007/08, the subsidy to wheat input peaked at 23 
%,  as the gap between export parity and domestic wheat prices increased sharply. Nevertheless, 
flour millers were taxed in this year, as the increase of the flour export parity price over domestic 
flour prices was even greater. 
In recent years, the subsidy to wheat input has declined due to the convergence of domestic 
wheat prices and the wheat export parity price. As flour millers continued to be taxed on flour 
output, the net result was taxation. The extent of taxation was, however, lower compared to the 
early 2000s, as the gap between domestic flour prices and flour border prices narrowed.  
Flour consumers 
Flour consumers (i.e. companies and households purchasing wheat flour) are generally 
subsidized by existing policies. The average NRA to flour consumers over 2000-2013 is in the 
order of  5 % to 13 %, depending on the assumptions about border prices. Subsidization is highest 
                                                     
36 The average spread between the release price and the wheat price on the wholesale market over the period 2000-
2013 is 1.13 Rupees per kilogram. At an average of 5.2 million tons of wheat released each year, flour mill savings 
on wheat input in 2000-2013 amounted  to an average of 6.3 billion Rupees per year. These cost savings in wheat 
input are presumably captured by flour mills in the form of increased profits, since wheat is generally sold at the price 
of flour on the wholesale market rather than the government stipulated sales price (cf. section 3). 
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in the sub-period 2000-2004 regardless of the border price, with an average NRA of 12 % to 21 
%. In the following sub-periods, average subsidization is substantially lower with an average NRA 
in the order of 1 to 9 %. 
The subsidization of flour consumers is explained by the fact that retail flour prices are 
generally below flour border prices. Domestic retail flour prices are kept below border prices 
through government wheat releases and trade restrictions. At the height of the international food 
price spike in 2007/08, the government reinforced these policies with large-scale public wheat 
imports and an (incompletely enforced) export ban on wheat and flour to all markets. Domestic 
retail flour prices were kept in check, resulting in a particularly large gap between domestic and 
border prices and a substantial jump in the subsidy to flour consumers, which more than doubled 
to 22 % - 27 % in 2007/08.  
In recent years, the subsidy to flour consumers has declined: the NRA remains near or 
below 10 % for both border prices.  This decline is again explained by the convergence of domestic 
retail flour prices and the flour export parity price.  
As mentioned before, the subsidy to flour consumers through the Utility Stores is not 
captured by the NRAs, but it is unlikely that this subsidy will change the main conclusions here. 
5.3.  Summary of welfare effects along the value chain 
Wheat farmers 
Regardless of the indicator for farmgate prices, we find that farmers are taxed by government 
policies in nearly all years. The magnitude of taxation depends on assumptions about the farmgate 
price. Assuming that the farmgate price equals the support price of wheat set by the government, 
average farmer taxation in 2000-2013 is 15 %. Assuming that the farmgate price equals the 
wholesale price of wheat minus trader marketing costs, farmer taxation is on average 9 %. During 
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the food price spike in 2007/08, the tax on wheat farmers increases strongly to the order of 24 % 
to  37 %. Farmers were not able to profit from rising international wheat prices because domestic 
wheat prices were kept low by a wheat (flour) export ban and large-scale government wheat 
releases to the domestic market. However, in later years the gap between domestic prices and 
international prices declined, with domestic wheat prices fluctuating around export parity after 
2010. As a result, in recent years farmer taxation is substantially lower, with the NRA close to zero 
in the last two years. 
Wheat traders 
Not surprisingly, the impact depends on the farmgate price indicator. If the farmgate price equals 
the wholesale price of wheat minus trader marketing costs, the NRA to wheat traders is zero in all 
periods, as the positive NRA to trader input cancels out the negative NRA to trader output. 
If the farmgate price equals the support price, wheat traders are generally subsidized by 
existing government policies: the average subsidy for 2000-2013 is 6 %. During the international 
food price spike, subsidization increases as traders were able to capture much of the gains of higher 
domestic prices. As a result, average trader subsidization is highest in the sub-period 2005-2008 
at 10 %. This result indicates that the combination of wheat price spikes and the support price 
policy are benefitting wheat traders, and not farmers, when traders pay farmers the support price. 
In recent years, average subsidization of wheat traders declines. This result corresponds to the 
decrease of wheat farmer taxation and is caused by the fact that domestic wheat prices fluctuated 
around export parity since late 2010.  
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Flour millers 
Flour millers are generally taxed by existing wheat policies, but the effect is relatively small. 
Average taxation for the entire 2000-2013 period is 4 %, but the NRA varies across sub-periods, 
with modest net subsidization occurring in several years. At the height of the food price spike in 
2007/08, the tax on flour increased sharply as the export parity exceeded domestic wholesale flour 
prices by far. Even though flour millers were substantially subsidized on wheat inputs (with 
domestic wheat prices below export parity) the subsidy was not sufficient to compensate the large 
tax on output. As a result, the tax on flour millers was 6 % during the 2007/08 price spike. In recent 
years, the tax on flour continues to exceed the subsidy on wheat input, resulting in modest net 
taxation of flour millers.    
Flour consumers 
The NRA to flour consumers is calculated using two alternative sets of border prices, based on 
two extreme scenario’s. The first scenario assumes that marketing costs of wheat flour retailers are 
equal to the price margin between wholesale and retail flour prices (i.e. their marketing margin is 
zero). The resulting border prices are the upper bound on actual border prices measured at the retail 
market. The second scenario assumes that retailer marketing costs are zero (i.e. the retailer 
marketing margin is equal to the price margin) and the resulting border prices are the lower bound 
on actual border prices measured at the retail market. The actual NRA to flour consumers will 
probably be in between the NRAs calculated using the upper bound and lower bound border 
prices.37 
                                                     
37 Our estimates do not include the subsidy to flour consumers through the sales of wheat flour at below-market rates 
in Utility Stores, which implies that we are underestimating flour consumer subsidization, possibly by 3 % to 8 % in 
recent years (according to a quick, back-of-the-envelope calculation). 
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We find that flour consumers are on average subsidized by government policies in 2000-
2013 in the order of 5 % to 13 % depending on the assumptions about border prices. However, the 
NRA to flour consumers fluctuates considerably across the period due to large fluctuations of the 
export parity price of wheat flour. Consumer subsidization peaks at the height of the food price 
spike in 2007/08 at 22 % to 27 %, as domestic consumer prices were kept low by the export ban 
on wheat (flour) and large-scale public wheat imports and releases. Consumer subsidization was 
particularly high in the early 2000s, as domestic retail flour prices were substantially lower than 
border prices; in 2000-2004, the average subsidy was between 12 % and 21 %. In recent years, the 
NRA to flour consumers somewhat stabilizes. On average consumers continue to be subsidized in 
2009-2013, but the subsidy remains below 10 %.  
6. Conclusions 
The concept of “producers” and “consumers” in economic analysis is a combination of different 
agents (interest groups) along the value chain. In this paper, we have disaggregated 
distortions/rents to the “consumer” and “producer” groups into rents to various actors within these 
groups. We have first presented a modified NRA indicator, which allows to measure the impact of 
policies on several groups along the value chain.  
We have applied this value chain approach to measuring distortions and rent distribution 
in the specific case of the wheat-flour chain in Pakistan. We disaggregated the “producer” group 
into wheat farmers and wheat traders and the “consumer” group into flour milling companies and 
households and companies purchasing wheat flour (flour consumers).  
Our analysis shows that interpreting the aggregate NRAs to “producers” and “consumers” 
as policy impacts on farmers and on final consumers (households) leads to biased conclusions, but 
the bias is relatively limited.  The tax on farmers is higher than the producer NRA indicates because 
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wheat traders benefit from the policy system.  The average tax on “producers” for 2000-2013 is 9 
%, but taxation varies significantly over time: from 20 % in 2000-2004 to 2 % in the 2009-2013 
period. There are no good data on farm-level prices, so we considered the two extreme possibilities, 
i.e. that the farmgate price equals (i) the support price paid by the government or (ii) the wholesale 
wheat price minus trader marketing costs. Traders were subsidized on average between 0 % and 6 
% in 2000-2013, and the effects were larger in the early period (between 0 % and 8 % in 2000-
2008) when farm taxation was highest, compared to recent years (between 0 % and 4 % in 2009-
2013).  As a result, wheat policy-induced taxes on farms were between 9 % and 15 % on average 
over the entire 2000-2013 period, with the highest taxes in 2000-2008 (between 13 % to 21 %), 
and the lowest in recent years (between 2 % to 6 % in 2009-2013). 
On the consumption side, the benefits for final consumers (households) are larger  than the 
consumer NRA indicates because the system implies a tax on flour mills. “Consumers” are 
generally subsidized in 2000-2013 by government policies, but the NRA is small: the average 
NRA for 2000-2013 equals 5 %. This subsidization of “consumers” also declines in recent years, 
although the decline is less pronounced compared to the “producer” tax. The average subsidy to 
“consumers” was 7 % in 2000-2008 and falls to 1 % in 2009-2013.  Depending on assumptions on 
wheat flour import prices (and sources), average flour miller taxation was between 4 % and 8 % 
from 2000 to 2013 (and relatively constant over the period).  Flour consumers were subsidized on 
average between 5 % and 13 % from  2000-2013, with the highest subsidies in 2000-2008 (between 
7 % and 15 %), falling to between 1 % to 9 % in 2009-2013. 
In summary, our value chain NRA analysis indicates that the wheat price policy in Pakistan 
has generally benefitted flour consumers and wheat traders at the expense of farmers (and to a 
lesser extent flour millers) in 2000-2013, but the effects are relatively small. During the 2007/08 
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food price shock, government interventions such as the export ban prevented farmers from 
profiting from the spike in international wheat prices and led to a large increase in farmer taxation. 
Domestic prices were prevented from following the international price surge, resulting in an 
increase in flour consumer subsidization. In recent years, government interventions were scaled 
down again, which is reflected in reduced rent effects for all agents along the value chain. From 
late 2010 onwards, the convergence of domestic wheat (flour) prices and export parity prices 
reduced consumer and trader subsidization and farmer taxation to close to zero. 
 The results of our disaggregated NRA calculations for different agents along the value 
chain paint a more nuanced picture of the welfare effects of government wheat policies, and 
illustrate how the distribution of aggregate distortions/rents within “producer” and “consumer” 
groups is affected by the interaction between government policies and domestic and international 
prices. Not surprisingly, the empirical difficulties encountered by measuring the standard 
(producer and consumer) NRAs are more important when trying to disentangle them along 
different agents in the value chain.  However, despite these difficulties it is an important exercise 
if one wants to design policies that target the poorest groups along the value chains, realizing that 
the “producer” and “consumer” umbrellas typically include both richer and poorer groups of 
society.   
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: International and Pakistan wheat prices for 1994-2013. 
 
Source: International wheat price (FOB US Gulf HRW1) from World Bank. Wholesale price of wheat at Lahore from Dorosh-Salam dataset and Punjab Institute for 
Agricultural Marketing. 
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Figure 2: Real support price and wholesale price minus trader marketing costs for 1991-2013. 
 
Source: Support price and Lahore wholesale wheat price from Dorosh-Salam dataset and Punjab Institute for Agricultural Marketing. Trader marketing costs calculated using 
data from International Finance Corporation (2011) and API and extended using the monthly Pakistan CPI.  
Notes: Real prices are calculated by deflating nominal prices using the monthly Pakistan CPI (base year 2005).
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Figure 3: NRA (%) to “producers” and “consumers” for 2000-2013. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: The NRA to “producers” (wheat sector) is equal to the sum of the NRAs to wheat farmers and wheat traders. The NRA to “consumers” is equal to the sum of the NRA 
to flour millers and the average NRA to flour consumers (across NRAs for upper and lower bound border prices). The NRAs for flour millers and flour consumers are 
calculated using EU/Black Sea import parity prices.
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Figure 4: NRA to wheat farmers and wheat traders for alternative farmgate price indicators for 2000-2013. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: ‘Support’ indicates that farmgate prices are assumed equal to the support price; ‘wholesale’ indicates that farmgate prices are assumed equal to the wholesale wheat 
price minus marketing costs from the farmgate to the wholesale market in Lahore.
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Figure 5: Disaggregated NRA to wheat traders (input, output, total) using the support price indicator for 2000-2013. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 6: NRA (%) to flour millers and flour consumers (for upper and lower bound border prices) for 2000-2013. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: ‘Lower’ and ‘upper’ indicate that lower bound, respectively upper bound border prices were used to calculate the NRA to flour consumers. The NRAs for flour millers 
and flour consumers are calculated using EU/Black Sea import parity prices.
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Figure 7: Disaggregated NRA to flour millers (input, output, total) for 2000-2013. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: The NRAs for flour millers are calculated using EU/Black Sea import parity prices.
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Table 1: Average NRA (%) for different agents along the value chain 
Agent     2000-2013 2000-2004 2005-2008 2009-2013 
NRA to “producers” (wheat sector) - 9.2% - 20.0% - 7.5% - 1.9% 
Wheat farmers 
Sales at support price a - 15.2% - 24.8% - 17.8% - 5.6% 
Sales at wholesale price – costs b - 8.9% - 19.7% - 7.1% - 1.7% 
Wheat traders 
Sales at support price a 6.0% 4.8% 10.2% 3.7% 
Sales at wholesale price – costs b 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
      
NRA to "consumers"  4.7% 7.0% 6.9% 1.0% 
Flour millers 
  
- 4.2% - 9.4% 1.2% - 4.3% 
  
     Flour consumers 
Upper bound border price c 12.8% 21.2% 8.8% 9.3% 
Lower bound border price d 4.8% 11.6% 2.5% 1.2% 
Source: Author's calculations. Notes: NRAs are calculated across wheat crop marketing years. Hence, the year 2000 starts on May 1st, 2000, and the year 2013 ends 
on April 30th, 2013. The NRAs for flour millers and flour consumers are calculated using EU/Black Sea import parity prices. The NRA to “consumers” is 
calculated as the sum of the NRA to flour millers and the average NRA to flour consumers. 
a: We assume that traders pay farmers the support price, and fluctuations in the wholesale price of wheat are captured entirely by traders (see section 4.2.1). 
b: We assume that traders pay farmers the wholesale price of wheat minus trader marketing costs, and fluctuations in the wholesale price are passed on entirely to 
farmers (see section 4.2.1). 
c: We assume that marketing costs of retailers are equal to the price margin between the wholesale price of wheat flour and the retail price of wheat flour. This 
assumption produces an upper bound for wheat flour border prices at the retail market and for the resulting NRAs to flour consumers (see section 4.4.1). 
d: We assume that marketing costs of retailers are zero (see section 4.4.1). This assumption produces a lower bound for wheat flour border prices at the retail 
market and for the resulting NRAs to flour consumers (see section 4.4.1). 
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Appendix 1: Methodology for calculating NRA to farmer input 
Annual NRAs to input are calculated using annual averages of border prices and domestic 
prices. Monthly NRAs are calculated using monthly import parity prices and annual 
domestic prices due to the unavailability of monthly domestic fertilizer prices. 
The international reference prices for DAP (diammonium phosphate)  and urea were 
taken from the World Bank. For DAP the price is the FOB US Gulf price; for urea the price 
is the FOB Black Sea price (primarily Yuzhnyy). World market prices were calculated by 
adding international ocean freight rates from the US Gulf to Karachi to the international 
DAP price and freight rates from the Black Sea to Karachi (estimated at 85 % of US Gulf 
freight rates) to the international urea price. The import parity price at Lahore is then equal 
to the world market price times the nominal exchange rate (Pak Rs/USD) plus import 
marketing costs from Karachi to Lahore. We abstract from any quality adjustments. 
The conversion rates of DAP and urea (𝑄𝑗
𝑓/𝑄𝑜
𝑓) are equal to the number of kilograms 
of fertilizer used to produce one kilogram of wheat. These rates were calculated using the 
use of fertilizer per hectare for wheat production for 2011/12 and 2012/13 from the 
Agriculture Policy Institute and annual yield data for wheat taken from the Pakistan 
Economic Survey 2012-13. We assume that the use of fertilizer per hectare was constant 
over the period 2000-2013. Annual fertilizer prices are averages for Pakistan and were taken 
from the Pakistan Economic Survey 2012-13. 
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Appendix 2: Methodology for calculating import and export parity prices for wheat 
For the calculation of the import and export parity prices of wheat, we have followed Dorosh 
and Valdés (1990) and Dorosh and Salam (2007).  
The import parity price for wheat 
The CIF price at the border in Karachi equals the international price of wheat (US FOB Gulf 
HRW2) plus international freight costs from the US Gulf to Karachi times the nominal 
exchange rate (Pak Rs/USD). The import parity price at the wholesale market in Lahore 
equals the CIF price at the border in Karachi (adjusted for a quality difference of 5 %) plus 
import and domestic marketing costs from Karachi to the wholesale market in Lahore. The 
import parity price at the farmgate equals the import parity at the wholesale market minus 
marketing costs from the farmgate to the wholesale market in Lahore.  
The export parity price for wheat at the farmgate 
The FOB price at the border of Karachi equals the international price of wheat (US FOB 
Gulf HRW2) plus international freight costs from Karachi to the Middle East/South Asia 
times the nominal exchange rate (Pak Rs/USD). The export parity price at the wholesale 
market in Lahore equals the FOB price at the border in Karachi minus export and domestic 
marketing costs from Karachi to the wholesale market in Lahore. The export parity price at 
the farmgate in Lahore equals the export parity price at the wholesale market minus 
marketing costs from the farmgate to the wholesale market in Lahore.  
The monthly international wheat price for US Gulf HRW2 was taken from the FAO 
commodity price database and the official nominal exchange rate was taken from the IMF 
International Finance Statistics. Import and export marketing costs include insurance, 
landing and handling costs, commissions for the Trading Corporation Pakistan (TCP), 
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interest costs and other miscellaneous expenses. Marketing costs before 2005/06 were taken 
from the Dorosh and Salam (2007) dataset; marketing costs for the years after were taken 
from the Agricultural Policy Institute (API). International freight rates from the US Gulf to 
Karachi were taken from the Dorosh-Salam dataset for 2000-2006 and from IGC for 2007-
2013. International freight rates from Karachi to the Middle East/South Asia were estimated 
to be 75 % of freight rates from the US Gulf to Karachi.  
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Appendix 3: Methodology for calculating border prices for wheat flour 
Autarky prices 
Autarky prices are calculated by adding marketing and processing costs of flour milling in Pakistan 
to the autarky wholesale wheat price in Lahore. Marketing and processing costs for 2010/11 were 
taken from (International Finance Corporation 2011) and extended using the monthly CPI. 
Marketing costs include transportation, handling and service fees to traders. 
Import and export parity prices 
The calculation of import and export parity prices for wheat flour is not straightforward. Contrary 
to wheat grain, wheat flour is not a widely-traded commodity with a clearly identified international 
reference price. We have therefore calculated an import parity price for two scenario’s. In the first 
scenario, we assume that Pakistan would import wheat flour from Kazakhstan under free trade. 
Kazakhstan has recently become one of the global leaders in wheat flour exports and the main 
supplier of wheat flour to the Central and South Asia region. As Kazakhstan has historically been 
the main supplier of wheat flour to the north of Afghanistan (Persaud 2013), wheat flour from 
Kazakhstan should be able to reach Pakistan as well. In this scenario, the import parity price of 
wheat flour at Lahore is equal to the Kazakhstan wheat flour FOB price (times the Pakistan 
Rs./USD nominal exchange rate) plus marketing costs from Kazakhstan to Lahore, adjusted for a 
quality difference of 5 %.  
The second scenario assumes that Pakistan would import wheat flour from the EU or Black 
Sea region under free trade. Wheat flour imported from the EU/Black Sea region would likely be 
less costly for Pakistan than importing wheat flour from Kazakhstan due to significant land freight 
costs for the latter. In addition, since 2003 a large share of wheat flour imports (although mainly 
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in the form of humanitarian aid or food aid) has come from the EU-27, Turkey or Ukraine. For the 
EU/Black Sea region, we use the FOB export price of Turkey, the second global leader in wheat 
flour exports, as the international reference price. The import parity price at Lahore is then equal 
to the Turkey wheat flour FOB price plus international ocean freight costs from the EU/Black Sea 
region to South Asia (times the nominal exchange rate) plus marketing costs from Karachi to 
Lahore, adjusted for a quality difference of 5 %.  
According to UN Comtrade statistics, in 2003-2013 over 90 % of wheat flour exports from 
Pakistan have flowed to Afghanistan (with the exception of 2011 where the share is 75 %, see 
Section 2). We therefore assume that under free trade Pakistan would continue to export wheat 
flour mostly to Afghanistan and that the export parity price is mainly determined by demand in 
Afghanistan (see also World Bank, 2010: 124, footnote 88). As Kazakhstan is the leading wheat 
flour exporter in the region and the main competitor of Pakistan flour exports in Afghanistan, we 
take the FOB wheat flour price of Kazakhstan as the international reference price. The export 
parity price of wheat flour at Lahore is then equal to the Kazakhstan FOB wheat flour price plus 
freight rates from Kazakhstan to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border minus transport and marketing 
costs from Lahore to the border (Peshawar).  
The unit value FOB wheat flour price for Turkey and Kazakhstan is calculated using annual 
UN Comtrade wheat flour trade statistics for the years 2000-2003 and monthly GTIS wheat flour 
trade data for the years 2004-2013. International ocean freight rates from the EU/Black Sea region 
to South Asia is estimated to be 85 % of US Gulf – Karachi freight rates, which are taken from the 
Dorosh-Salam dataset for 2000-2006 and from IGC Grain Market Reports for 2007 onwards. 
Annual marketing costs from the Kazakhstan border to Kabul were taken from official statistics 
for 2011 and extended using the annual Kazakhstan CPI (base year 2005). Marketing costs from 
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Kabul to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Peshawar) were calculated from estimates for 2002 in 
Chabot and Dorosh (2007) and for 2012 in Food Security Response Analysis Support Team 
Afghanistan (RASTA), (2014). Both series were extended using the monthly Pakistan CPI. 
Marketing costs from Lahore to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Peshawar) were calculated from 
estimates for 2012 in (RASTA, 2014) and extended using the monthly Pakistan CPI. 
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Appendix 4: Additional tables and Figures 
Table A1: Overview of wheat policies and the wheat market in Pakistan since the 1990s. 
Period Description Production  Procurement  Distribution Net Imports 
Net 
availability 
per capita 
Real 
wholesale 
price wheat 
  ('000 MT) ('000 MT) ('000 MT) ('000 MT) (kg/capita) (2005 Rs/kg) 
1988/89 - 
1999/00 
Liberalized retail sales; 
Large-scale public imports 
lower market prices 
15 845 3 681 5 671 2 369 132 9.05 
2000/01 - 
2006/07 
Reduced public imports 
and net availability; 
domestic prices rise; 
exports to Afghanistan 
19 986 4 572 4 391 -376 114 10.63 
2007/08 - 
2008/09 
Very high world prices; 
domestic prices rise; 
exports banned; large 
public imports 
22 127 4 170 6 052 315 118 12.96 
2009/10 
International prices fall; 
domestic prices at import 
parity, but little trade 
24 033 9 231 5 985 147 106 15.31 
2010/11 - 
2012/13 
Moderate rise in world 
prices; domestic prices at 
export parity; net exports 
23 999 6 219 6 348 -1 463 116 12.96 
Source: Author’s calculations. Production, procurement and distribution data from Pakistan Economic Survey. Trade data from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 
FAO and the  UN Comtrade database (for 2011/12 and 2012/13). Lahore wholesale wheat prices from Dorosh-Salam dataset and Punjab Institute for 
Agricultural Marketing. 
Notes: Production, procurement and distribution data are supplied for fiscal years. Production in the previous year is used to calculate net availability in the 
current year. 
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Table A2: World Bank estimates of NRA, NRA to output and NRA to input for wheat in 
Pakistan, 2000-2010. 
Year NRA NRA to output NRA to input 
2000 0.093 0.073 0.020 
2001 -0.146 -0.178 0.032 
2002 -0.266 -0.287 0.021 
2003 -0.290 -0.302 0.012 
2004 -0.132 -0.150 0.018 
2005 -0.095 -0.124 0.029 
2006 -0.315 -0.315 0.000 
2007 -0.484 -0.484 0.000 
2008 -0.634 -0.634 0.000 
2009 -0.017 -0.017 0.000 
2010 -0.028 -0.028 0.000 
Source: World Bank Updated Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (Anderson and Nelgen, 2013). 
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Table A3: Calculation of NRA to wheat farmers (prices in Rs/kg) 
Marketing 
Year 
Border 
price 
Support 
price 
Wholesale 
wheat - 
trader costs 
Import 
parity 
farmgate 
Export 
parity 
farmgate 
Autarky 
price 
farmgate 
NRA 
support 
NRA 
wholesale 
NRA 
input 
2000/01 Import 7.50 7.62 10.45 5.87 4.76 -0.26 -0.25 0.02 
2001/02 Import 7.50 7.49 11.50 6.74 6.74 -0.33 -0.34 0.01 
2002/03 Autarky 7.50 7.92 12.85 8.03 9.38 -0.19 -0.14 0.01 
2003/04 Autarky 7.50 8.93 12.48 7.52 9.76 -0.21 -0.06 0.02 
2004/05 Autarky 8.75 10.55 12.64 7.55 12.42 -0.26 -0.12 0.03 
2005/06 Autarky 10.00 10.84 13.33 8.18 9.63 0.09 0.18 0.05 
2006/07 Autarky 10.38 11.22 17.53 11.83 13.64 -0.17 -0.11 0.07 
2007/08 Export 10.63 13.33 28.61 20.31 16.75 -0.37 -0.24 0.10 
2008/09 Autarky 15.63 20.12 28.62 20.21 25.77 -0.28 -0.11 0.11 
2009/10 Import 23.75 24.10 25.51 17.03 15.64 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 
2010/11 Export 23.75 24.46 31.57 22.74 23.52 0.08 0.11 0.03 
2011/12 Export 25.21 24.74 34.39 25.20 23.80 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
2012/13 Export 27.81 27.57 39.39 29.39 31.21 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 
Source: Author's calculations. Wholesale price wheat at Lahore from Dorosh-Salam dataset and Punjab Institute for Agricultural Marketing. Notes: 
Appendix 2 provides details on the calculation of import and export parity prices for wheat. Autarky prices supplied by P. Dorosh. 
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Table A4: Calculation of NRA to wheat traders (prices in Rs/kg) 
Marketing 
year 
NRA input 
support 
NRA input 
wholesale 
Wholesale 
wheat 
Lahore 
Import 
parity 
wheat 
Lahore 
Export 
parity 
wheat 
Lahore 
Autarky 
price wheat 
Lahore 
NRA 
output 
NRA 
support 
NRA 
wholesale 
2000/01 0.27 0.26 8.08 10.90 6.33 5.22 -0.26 0.01 0.00 
2001/02 0.33 0.34 7.95 11.97 7.21 7.21 -0.34 0.00 0.00 
2002/03 0.19 0.15 8.40 13.33 8.51 9.86 -0.15 0.04 0.00 
2003/04 0.22 0.08 9.43 12.98 8.02 10.26 -0.08 0.14 0.00 
2004/05 0.28 0.14 11.10 13.18 8.09 12.96 -0.14 0.14 0.00 
2005/06 -0.04 -0.12 11.42 13.91 8.76 10.21 0.12 0.08 0.00 
2006/07 0.23 0.17 11.75 18.06 12.36 14.17 -0.17 0.06 0.00 
2007/08 0.46 0.33 14.13 29.41 21.10 17.54 -0.33 0.13 0.00 
2008/09 0.38 0.21 21.21 29.71 21.30 26.86 -0.21 0.17 0.00 
2009/10 0.05 0.05 25.32 26.73 18.25 16.87 -0.05 0.01 0.00 
2010/11 -0.04 -0.07 25.77 32.89 24.06 24.83 0.07 0.03 0.00 
2011/12 0.00 0.02 26.07 35.73 26.53 25.13 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
2012/13 0.05 0.06 28.93 40.75 30.76 32.58 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 
Source: Author's calculations. Wholesale price wheat at Lahore from Dorosh-Salam dataset and Punjab Institute for Agricultural Marketing. Notes: 
Appendix 2 provides details on the calculation of import and export parity prices for wheat. Autarky prices supplied by P. Dorosh. 
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Table A5: Calculation of NRA to flour millers for EU import parity prices (prices in Rs/kg)  
Marketing 
Year 
Release 
price 
Wholesale 
price flour 
Lahore 
Import parity 
flour Lahore 
(EU) 
Export parity 
flour Lahore 
 
Autarky 
price flour 
Lahore 
NRA 
input 
(EU) 
NRA 
output 
(EU) 
NRA 
(EU) 
2000/01 7.75 8.64 13.62 10.76 6.86 0.18 -0.37 -0.18 
2001/02 8.00 8.57 14.59 11.52 8.89 0.22 -0.41 -0.19 
2002/03 8.00 9.69 17.02 12.44 11.60 0.12 -0.16 -0.05 
2003/04 8.36 11.62 16.58 17.16 12.06 0.08 -0.04 0.04 
2004/05 9.64 13.44 17.55 13.47 14.93 0.13 -0.10 0.03 
2005/06 10.78 14.20 16.49 12.86 12.34 -0.07 0.15 0.08 
2006/07 10.96 14.24 20.67 14.37 16.46 0.14 -0.13 0.00 
2007/08 13.18 18.28 32.41 25.91 20.06 0.23 -0.29 -0.06 
2008/09 17.82 25.61 41.01 38.77 29.93 0.19 -0.14 0.05 
2009/10 23.68 31.44 32.86 26.36 20.30 0.06 -0.04 0.01 
2010/11 24.69 28.80 40.04 32.58 28.57 -0.03 -0.12 -0.15 
2011/12 24.95 31.41 44.45 34.20 29.05 0.02 -0.08 -0.06 
2012/13 27.08 34.58 51.01 39.44 36.82 0.06 -0.12 -0.07 
Source: Author's calculations. Release price from Dorosh-Salam dataset. Wholesale price wheat flour at Lahore from Pakistan Bureau of 
Statistics.  
Notes: Appendix 3 provides details on the calculation of wheat flour border prices. The wholesale wheat flour price is for wheat flour of 
superior quality. 
 
56 
 
Table A6: Calculation of NRA to flour consumers for EU import parity prices (prices in Rs/kg) 
Marketing 
Year 
Retail 
price 
wheat 
flour 
Upper 
import 
parity flour 
(EU) 
Upper 
export parity 
flour 
Upper 
autarky 
price flour 
 
Lower 
import 
parity 
flour (EU) 
Lower 
export 
parity flour 
Lower 
Autarky 
price flour 
NRA 
Upper 
NRA 
Lower 
2000/01 10.83 15.81 12.95 9.05 13.62 10.76 6.86 0.31 0.20 
2001/02 11.00 17.02 13.95 11.33 14.59 11.52 8.89 0.35 0.25 
2002/03 11.14 18.47 13.88 13.05 17.02 12.44 11.60 0.15 0.04 
2003/04 12.36 17.32 17.90 12.80 16.58 17.16 12.06 0.03 -0.03 
2004/05 14.46 18.57 14.49 15.95 17.55 13.47 14.93 0.09 0.03 
2005/06 15.00 17.30 13.67 13.14 16.49 12.86 12.34 -0.14 -0.22 
2006/07 15.42 21.84 15.55 17.63 20.67 14.37 16.46 0.13 0.06 
2007/08 20.21 34.35 27.85 22.00 32.41 25.91 20.06 0.27 0.22 
2008/09 29.26 44.66 42.41 33.57 41.01 38.77 29.93 0.13 0.02 
2009/10 34.67 36.09 29.58 23.53 32.86 26.36 20.30 0.04 -0.05 
2010/11 31.68 42.92 35.46 31.45 40.04 32.58 28.57 0.11 0.03 
2011/12 34.04 47.08 36.84 31.69 44.45 34.20 29.05 0.08 0.00 
2012/13 36.98 53.40 41.83 39.22 51.01 39.44 36.82 0.12 0.06 
Source: Author's calculations. Retail wheat flour price at Lahore from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.  
Notes: The wheat flour retail price is the price for wheat flour of superior quality. 
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Figure A1: Production, government procurement and government releases of wheat in Pakistan for 1990-2013. 
 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey. 
Notes: The Pakistan Economic Survey supplies production, procurement and release data by fiscal year. Hence, the figure shows data for FY1991-FY2013. 
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Figure A2: Real wheat border prices, domestic wheat prices and wheat (flour) trade for Pakistan for 1991-2013. 
 
Source: Import and export parity prices for wheat from author’s calculations (see Appendix 2 for details). Trade data from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, FAO and the UN 
Comtrade database (for 2011/12 and 2012/13). Support price and Lahore wholesale wheat prices from Dorosh-Salam dataset and Punjab Institute for Agricultural Marketing. 
Notes: Import and export parity prices shown here are measured at the wholesale market in Lahore and are calculated using the FOB price for US Gulf HRW1 wheat. The 
import and export parity prices used for the calculation of the NRAs are based on the FOB price for US Gulf HRW2 wheat, which is most comparable to Pakistan wheat. The 
reason for showing HRW1 border prices in this Figure is the unavailability of US Gulf HRW2 wheat prices before January 1998. Wheat flour trade quantities are converted 
to wheat equivalents using a conversion factor of 0.77. Real prices are calculated by deflating nominal prices using the monthly Pakistan CPI (base year 2005).
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Figure A3: Real wheat flour border prices, domestic wheat (flour) prices and wheat flour trade for 2000-2013. 
 
Source: Import and export parity prices for wheat flour from author’s calculations (see Appendix 3 for details). Trade data from annual FAO data until 2011 and monthly data 
from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics for 2011-2013. Domestic prices from Dorosh-Salam dataset, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics and Punjab Institute for Agricultural Marketing.  
Notes: Wheat flour prices are prices for Atta flour of superior quality. The wholesale price of wheat flour shows annual data before July 2008 (deflated by the annual CPI) 
and monthly data afterwards (deflated by the monthly CPI). Import parity prices are calculated assuming wheat flour imports from the EU. Import and export parity prices are 
measured at the wholesale market in Lahore and are used for the calculation of the NRA to flour millers. These border prices are equivalent to the lower bound parity prices 
used for the calculation of the NRA to flour consumers. Real prices are calculated by deflating nominal prices using the monthly Pakistan CPI (base year 2005).
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Figure A4: Import parity, export parity and autarky prices for wheat for 2000-2013. 
 
Source Author’s calculations. Appendix 2 provides details on the calculation of import and export parity prices. Autarky prices were supplied by P. Dorosh. 
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Figure A5: Import parity, export parity and autarky prices for wheat flour for 2000-2013. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. Appendix 3 provides details calculation of wheat flour border prices.  
Notes: Wheat flour border prices and autarky prices are measured at the wholesale market in Lahore. These border prices correspond to the lower bound border 
prices at the retail market used for calculations of the NRA to flour consumers. 
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